When Reputation Is Property – Action for Protection of Personal Rights

Your name appears in a newspaper article. The story suggests—doesn’t quite say, but strongly implies—that you’ve committed fraud. Or a television segment broadcasts footage of your face, using it to illustrate a story about corporate malfeasance, though you had nothing to do with the scandal. Or a business competitor tells potential clients you’re untrustworthy, that deals with you end badly. In each case, something intangible but valuable has been damaged: your reputation, your dignity, your sense of self.

Polish law treats these injuries seriously. Under Articles 23 and 24 of the Civil Code, personal rights (dobra osobiste)—including health, freedom, honor, freedom of conscience, name or pseudonym, image, secrecy of correspondence, inviolability of residence, scientific, artistic, inventive and innovative creativity—remain under civil-law protection independently of protection provided in other provisions.

The category is deliberately broad. Personal rights encompass anything that defines you as a person distinct from your property. They can’t be sold or transferred. They can be injured, and when they are, the law provides remedies. But proving injury, establishing that the defendant’s conduct was wrongful, and obtaining meaningful relief present challenges that make personal-rights litigation more art than science.

What Constitutes a Violation Worth Suing Over?

Resolving a case concerning violation of personal rights requires precise specification of the concrete personal right or rights that were violated. This constitutes the reference point for establishing whether action was wrongful and caused violation of a personal right. When seeking compensation for suffered harm, the plaintiff must precisely specify what personal rights were violated by illegal and culpable action—for instance, by an employer.

Evaluation of personal-rights violation, such as state of feelings, personal dignity, and bodily integrity, cannot rest on the interested party’s individual sensitivity, which may be particularly strong due to personal characteristics or health conditions. Evaluation criteria must be objectified by considering the opinions of a broader circle of participants and universally accepted standards of conduct, including customary aspects arising from tradition. [Supreme Court, Labor and Social Insurance Chamber, judgment of August 24, 2023, III PSKP 21/22]

This objectivity requirement creates an immediate tension. Personal rights are by definition personal—your feelings, your dignity, your sense of violation. But the law won’t protect hurt feelings if a reasonable person wouldn’t consider the conduct offensive. You might be hypersensitive. You might come from a culture or subculture with unusual standards. The law looks to mainstream social norms, not your particular sensibilities.

This makes sense as a limiting principle—otherwise, liability would depend entirely on finding a thin-skinned plaintiff. But it also means some genuine injuries go uncompensated. If you belong to a minority group and someone uses a slur that the majority culture doesn’t recognize as offensive, you might have trouble proving violation. Your injury is real, but the objective standard doesn’t capture it.

When evaluating whether personal-rights violation occurred, it’s essential to identify what reactions the violation evokes in external relations. Negative and critical statements that contain assertions concerning facts or evaluations, while simultaneously presenting the person seeking protection in a negative light, fall within the legally protected sphere of that person’s personal rights. [Court of Appeal in Kraków, First Civil Division, judgment of June 22, 2023, I ACa 76/22]

The test isn’t purely internal (how you feel) or purely external (what others think). It’s relational: how does the defendant’s conduct affect your standing in the eyes of others? A statement calling you incompetent at your job might not cause emotional distress if you have thick skin, but if it causes clients to avoid you, your professional reputation—a personal right—has been injured.

Press Articles and the Burden of Truth

In case of violating the victim’s dignity by attributing to them—in press articles—commission of a crime, eliminating wrongfulness requires conducting proof of truth. Inability to prove truth or lack of a final conviction judgment results in liability for personal-rights violation.

The Constitution in Article 42 regulates the issue of criminal liability, and Section 3 of that article guarantees presumption of innocence until guilt is established by a court. However, norms contained in Articles 23 and 24 of the Civil Code regarding protection of personal rights also remain in force. Therefore, the presumption-of-innocence principle cannot be used to limit the right to present truth, proof of which is possible both in criminal and civil proceedings. [Court of Appeal in Warsaw, Fifth Civil Division, judgment of June 20, 2023, V ACa 974/21]

This is the collision between two important principles. Presumption of innocence says you shouldn’t be treated as guilty until convicted. But freedom of expression includes the right to report truthfully on suspected wrongdoing. The resolution: if you publish an article saying someone committed a crime, you bear the burden of proving it’s true. If you can’t prove it, you’re liable—even if the person hasn’t been convicted yet, even if they’re never prosecuted.

The practical effect: journalists and publishers must be careful. You can report that someone has been accused of a crime, that charges have been filed, that prosecutors allege certain facts. These are verifiable statements. But if you flat-out say someone committed a crime, you better be prepared to prove it in civil court even if the criminal case hasn’t concluded.

The asymmetry is deliberate. Criminal conviction requires proof beyond reasonable doubt. Civil liability for personal-rights violation requires only proof by preponderance of evidence. So you might lose a defamation case even though the person you accused couldn’t be convicted criminally. The standards are different because the interests are different: criminal law punishes, civil law compensates.

Press Interviews and Cascading Liability

Personal rights are protected both under the Civil Code and under the Press Law Act of January 26, 1984. When personal-rights violation results from publishing press material (for example, broadcasting a television report), provisions of Articles 24, Sections 1 and 2 of the Civil Code and Article 37 of the Press Law apply simultaneously, permitting simultaneous or alternative application of protective measures, leaving the choice to the parties.

Article 38 of the Press Law indicates who can bear civil liability for violating rights through publication of press material, encompassing the author, editor, or other persons responsible for its publication, and the publisher. One cannot therefore conclude from this provision that a person giving an interview or providing information to a journalist that is used in a publication doesn’t bear liability for violating someone else’s personal rights. The author’s and publisher’s liability for a television report doesn’t relieve persons appearing in a television program from liability for content that may violate personal rights. [Court of Appeal in Łódź, First Civil Division, judgment of March 8, 2013, I ACa 1299/12]

This matters. Suppose you give a newspaper interview and make defamatory statements about a competitor. The newspaper publishes them. Both you and the newspaper can be sued. The fact that the newspaper had editorial control doesn’t shield you. You’re the source of the defamatory content; you bear responsibility for it.

The policy makes sense. Otherwise, people could defame with impunity by simply getting a journalist to publish their statements. “I didn’t say it publicly; the newspaper did.” That won’t work. If you make a statement to a journalist, intending and expecting it to be published, you’re responsible for the publication.

Properly balancing legally protected interests in the scope of press freedom and protection of good name of a person affected by press publication requires considering specific criteria. One should take into account whether the article contributed to debate on a topic of public interest, how well-known the person whom the publication concerns is, and what topic is discussed in the text. Also essential is the person’s conduct before publication, the manner of obtaining information and its truthfulness, and the content, form and consequences of publication, and the degree of the person’s exposure to negative effects resulting from its publication. [Supreme Court, Civil Chamber, judgment of April 28, 2021, I CSKP 87/21]

This is the balancing test courts use when press-freedom defenses are raised. Not all personal-rights violations by media are actionable. If you’re a public figure and the article concerns a matter of public interest, you get less protection. If you’re a private person and the article is gratuitous gossip, you get more. Courts weigh multiple factors and reach context-specific judgments.

The Structure of Liability

One whose personal right is threatened by another’s action may demand cessation of that action, unless it isn’t wrongful.

Liability for personal-rights violation is essentially delictual liability—liability for non-pecuniary damage (harm) caused by wrongful action of the injuring person. However, conditions of liability in this scope have been modified:

1. When pursuing non-pecuniary claims (Article 24, Section 1), the objective character of wrongfulness of the personal-rights-violating person’s action suffices. The subjective element of fault must be proven only when pursuing pecuniary claims under Article 448 or damage claims under Article 415 and other provisions in connection with Article 24, Section 2;
2. A presumption operates that personal-rights violation had wrongful character, meaning the defendant in proceedings would have to demonstrate that the action wasn’t wrongful to avoid liability;
3. Moreover, from the very essence of the non-pecuniary character of claims specified in Article 24, Section 1, it follows that they aren’t subject to statute of limitations. [Court of Appeal in Warsaw, First Civil Division, judgment of April 12, 2013, I ACa 1305/12]

This three-part structure is crucial. First, for non-monetary remedies (cease-and-desist orders, retractions), you don’t need to prove the defendant acted intentionally or negligently. You only need to show: (1) you have a personal right, (2) the defendant’s conduct threatens or violates it, and (3) the conduct is wrongful. For monetary compensation, you must additionally prove fault.

Second, wrongfulness is presumed. Normally in civil litigation, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof. But in personal-rights cases, once you prove your personal right was violated, the burden shifts to the defendant to show the conduct wasn’t wrongful—maybe it was privileged (a journalist reporting truthfully on a matter of public concern), maybe you consented, maybe some other justification applies.

Third, the claim for non-monetary remedies never expires. You can sue for a retraction or injunction decades after the violation. This differs from ordinary tort claims, which prescribe after a set period. The theory is that personal rights are so fundamental that time shouldn’t bar their vindication.

In case of accomplished violation, the person injured by wrongful actions may demand that the person who committed the violation perform acts necessary to remove its effects, particularly that it make a statement of appropriate content and in appropriate form. On principles provided in the Code, the person may also demand monetary compensation or payment of an appropriate sum of money for an indicated social purpose.

Protective measures for violated rights must be adequate to the violation itself, and their selection should be made considering the entirety of case circumstances. [Court of Appeal in Warsaw, First Civil Division, judgment of July 6, 2016, I ACa 1377/15]

The menu of remedies reflects the nature of the injury. Monetary damages might not repair damage to reputation or dignity. So the law provides equitable remedies: the defendant must publish a retraction, issue a public apology, or pay money to a charity chosen by the plaintiff. These remedies aim not to compensate economically but to restore the plaintiff’s dignity and social standing.

Courts must tailor remedies to violations. If a newspaper published a false article, the appropriate remedy might be requiring publication of a correction with similar prominence. If someone posted defamatory statements on social media, maybe the remedy is requiring deletion and posting an apology. If an employer humiliated an employee, maybe monetary compensation is appropriate because the relationship is private and public correction wouldn’t serve any purpose.

Issues Courts Must Resolve in Personal-Rights Cases

When considering a case concerning personal-rights protection, a court must first establish whether violation of these rights occurred at all, then evaluate whether the accused party’s action was wrongful. The obligation to prove that a personal right was threatened or violated rests on the person seeking legal protection according to Civil Code provisions.

In turn, the person who undertakes actions threatening or violating another person’s personal right must prove that the action wasn’t wrongful. Liability for damages depends on the fact of causing damage, which must also be proven by the party demanding compensation according to Civil Code provisions, and a key condition of this liability is culpable action by the perpetrator of damage. [Court of Appeal in Warsaw, First Civil Division, judgment of July 6, 2016, I ACa 1377/15]

This lays out the structure of proof. Stage one: Plaintiff proves violation. “The defendant published an article saying I embezzled funds. That injures my honor and reputation, which are personal rights.” Stage two: Defendant proves the conduct wasn’t wrongful. “The article was true. Here’s documentary evidence showing the plaintiff did embezzle funds. True statements aren’t wrongful even if they harm reputation.” Stage three (if plaintiff seeks damages): Plaintiff proves fault and causation. “The defendant knew the allegations were false, or failed to verify them despite readily available evidence of falsity. This caused me to lose clients and income in the amount of X.”

At each stage, the party with the burden of proof must meet it or lose. If the plaintiff can’t prove violation occurred, case dismissed. If the defendant can’t prove the conduct was justified, liability established (at least for non-monetary remedies). If the plaintiff seeking damages can’t prove fault and causation, no damages awarded (though other remedies might still be available).

Unjust Enrichment as an Alternative Theory

A person whose image is disseminated without consent has a claim for unjust enrichment, aimed at return of illegally obtained benefits. This obligation arises automatically and constitutes an essential tool for protecting individuals’ property rights according to the justice principle requiring giving each person what is owed (according to Article 2 of the Polish Constitution).

The obligation to return enrichment exists even without proven wrongful conduct. Existence of adequate causal connection between one person’s impoverishment and another’s enrichment isn’t necessary in case of unjust-enrichment obligations. [Supreme Court, Civil Chamber, judgment of December 16, 2020, I CSK 790/18]

This is an elegant workaround for a common problem. Suppose a company uses your photograph in an advertisement without permission. You could sue for personal-rights violation—they used your image without consent, violating your right to control your own likeness. But proving you suffered damages might be difficult. You’re not a professional model; you don’t license your image commercially; you can’t show lost income.

Unjust enrichment offers a different theory. The company benefited from using your image—they got an advertisement without paying a licensing fee. You’re entitled to recover that benefit, measured by what they would have paid if they’d licensed the image legitimately. You don’t need to prove you personally lost anything; you only need to prove they gained something.

The Supreme Court’s language is striking: the obligation arises “automatically” and doesn’t require proving wrongful conduct. This is remarkable. In ordinary unjust-enrichment cases, you must prove the enrichment lacked legal justification. Here, unauthorized use of someone’s image creates automatic liability. The policy is clear: your image belongs to you, and anyone who profits from it without permission must disgorge those profits.

The Intangible Made Tangible

Personal-rights litigation transforms the intangible into something courts can measure, value, and remedy. Your reputation becomes a legally protected interest. Your dignity gets assigned monetary value for purposes of awarding damages. Your sense of violation—if it comports with objective community standards—becomes actionable.

This transformation is both necessary and troubling. Necessary because without it, purely dignitary injuries would go unremedied. Someone could damage your reputation, humiliate you publicly, appropriate your identity for commercial purposes, and face no consequences if the only harm was to your feelings or social standing. Making personal rights actionable ensures these injuries matter legally.

But troubling because it requires reducing qualitative injuries to quantitative measurements. How much is a damaged reputation worth? What’s the appropriate compensation for public humiliation? How do you price dignity? Courts must answer these questions, but the answers are necessarily arbitrary. Two identical violations might yield different remedies depending on the judge, the jurisdiction, the year, the particular facts.

The law handles this arbitrariness by giving courts broad discretion. Remedies must be “adequate to the violation” considering “the entirety of circumstances.” This is law at its most flexible and, consequently, at its most unpredictable. You might win your case and receive substantial compensation. Or you might win and receive a token remedy the court deems sufficient. The uncertainty is inherent in trying to compensate non-economic injuries.

What’s clear is that personal rights matter. Polish law doesn’t treat reputation, dignity, and identity as mere social conventions or personal preferences. They’re legally protected interests, violations of which trigger liability and remedies. The mechanism isn’t perfect—the standards are vague, the outcomes uncertain, the remedies sometimes inadequate. But the principle is sound: what makes you human, what defines you as a person distinct from your property and economic value, deserves legal protection.

Robert Nogacki

Founder and Managing Partner of Skarbiec Law Firm, recognized by Dziennik Gazeta Prawna as one of the best tax advisory firms in Poland (2023, 2024). Legal advisor with 19 years of experience, serving Forbes-listed entrepreneurs and innovative start-ups. One of the most frequently quoted experts on commercial and tax law in the Polish media, regularly publishing in Rzeczpospolita, Gazeta Wyborcza, and Dziennik Gazeta Prawna. Author of the publication “AI Decoding Satoshi Nakamoto. Artificial Intelligence on the Trail of Bitcoin’s Creator” and co-author of the award-winning book “Bezpieczeństwo współczesnej firmy” (Security of a Modern Company). LinkedIn profile: 18 500 followers, 4 million views per year. Awards: 4-time winner of the European Medal, Golden Statuette of the Polish Business Leader, title of “International Tax Planning Law Firm of the Year in Poland.” He specializes in strategic legal consulting, tax planning, and crisis management for business.